Lee Jong-won, Vice President, Rikkyo University

　The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) administration has drawn attention with repeated expressions of interest in dialogue with North Korea over the past few days. The statements carry considerable weight, as they were made in public on several occasions by foreign minister Seiji Maehara, who is both the figure with general responsibility for Japanese foreign affairs and someone known to be a hard-liner. Nothing has yet surfaced as concrete action, but it certainly seems evident that a diplomatic message was intended for Pyongyang.

Drawing particular attention was Maehara’s active articulation of this perspective, which marks a step forward from before, at a New Year’s press conference. He offered moderate praise, albeit in the form of a response to a question, for North Korea’s joint New Year’s editorial, calling it “very gentle in tone.”

As a “major theme for 2011,” he also expressed hopes of having direct dialogue between North Korea and Japan, an area that had not theretofore been encouraged. He added that it was “important to establish a situation where dialogue between the two countries is possible, rather than leaving North Korea issues for other countries to deal with or handling them through multilateral meetings.” This statement strongly indicated a determination to have Japan attempt direct dialogue with Pyongyang instead of relying on the six-party talks format or the mediation of the U.S. and China.

When asked if he was timing the move with steps to resume the six-party talks, Maehara stressed that in 2011, he would “go about forming an environment where direct dialogue is possible rather than only multilateral meetings.” He also indirectly expressed intentions of differentiating his approach from those of past Liberal Democratic Party administrations.

There were signs from before that Naoto Kan’s DJP administration would seek to resume negotiations with North Korea. Interestingly enough, these moves began to enter full swing in the immediate wake of the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island. While it was not widely reported upon, the DJP announced its basic approach for dealing with the abductee issue for the first time on Nov. 29. In contrast with previous policy, the eight-point guideline omitted references to hardline measures such as sanctions and extradition of the perpetrators and emphasized “fulfillment of the August 2008 North Korea-Japan agreement” and “thorough investigations into victims of abductions,” a move that drew some attention.

The August 2008 agreement refers to an attempt during the LDP administration of Yasuo Fukuda to resume negotiations with Pyongyang through the reciprocal conditions of partial lifting of Japanese sanctions against North Korea and a reinvestigation of the abduction issue. It was hoped at the time that a breakthrough might be reached in the stalemate, but the agreement ended up collapsing with Fukuda’s abrupt resignation. The inclusion of this reference could be seen as a concrete proposal for going back to August 2008 and starting over.

This shift in policy underlay statements made by Maehara in a late 2010 interview with the Mainichi Daily News, when he said that "intermittent negotiations with North Korea are taking place in unseen ways" and that he would "push for official discussions by working-level officials in the New Year."

With tensions intensifying on the Korean Peninsula following the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island and inter-Korean relations racing toward disaster, Japan has proposed beefing up cooperation with South Korea to guarantee military security, for example through the deployment of its Self-Defense Forces, while at the same time remembering to make strategic moves to improve relations with Pyongyang in what could be called a show of realistic and pragmatic diplomacy.

Of course, underlying this is the realistic determination that Japan must not be left behind in the Korean Peninsula detente efforts currently under way, primarily through the efforts of Washington and Beijing. Domestic political calculations and considerations are another major factor, as the Kan administration seeks a way to turn around its floundering support ratings through diplomatic efforts. Having lost a majority in the Senate, Kan’s Cabinet finds itself in a situation where the future is impossible to predict. Nor is it likely to find a clear means of turning around the support ratings slump through economic measures before the unified local elections this spring.

While it may be not a surprise North Korea visit like that undertaken by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, the attempt to break the diplomatic deadlock does have significance in terms of domestic politics. The limitations are clear for a weak administration on shaky ground, but it is worthy watching closely to see how it factors into Korean Peninsula diplomatic efforts.

Essential Vocabulary: draw attention: 관심을 끌다/multilateral meetings: 다자 회담/abrupt resignation: 갑작스러운 사임